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NOVEMBER, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are cal/ed great questions and great
cases but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by because
they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone company, yet which have in them
the germ of some wider theory, and therefore some profound interstitialchange in the
very tissue of the law".-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.
The Law School endeavors to place graduates who are looking for positions.
Offices having vacancies to be filled and desiring to secure the services of a
graduate of the School may communicate with the Dean.
NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES
WILLS-BEQUEST TO EMPLOYEE ON CONDITION HE IS IN THE
EMPLOY AT DEATH OF THE TESTATOR. Hovey v. Grier.1
The case, Hovey v. Grier, decided recently by the Kansas City Court of Appeals,
presents an interesting problem in regard to a conditional bequest in a will. The will
;ncluded a provision that certain named beneficiaries, including E. W. Engle, should
receive certain bequests of stock, but provided that, "If either (naming the beneficiaries including E. W. Engle) shall not be in my employ at the time of my decease
or shall cease to work under the direction of my trustee George S. Hovey, that portion
of stock which would otherwise have gone to him shall be issued and delivered to
Celia Poinsett." E. W. Engle had been in the employ of the company but in 1918,
with consent of testator, he had entered the army where he remained until September
5, 1919, the testator having died some two months before in July 1919. Engle following his discharge from the army had returned to actual service for the company.
1.

Hovey v. Grier, 23 S. W. (2d) 1058 (1929).
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The court held that under the circumstances Engle was at the time of the death of
the testator in his employ, that the parties had not intended to and had not treated
the employee-employer relationship as ended; that therefore the relationship had
not been termina'ted and Engle was entitled to the bequest.
Obviously the question involved is whether Engle was an employee of the
company at the time of the testator's death. The particular reason for his absence,
namely, that he was serving in the army, does not seem to be of importance and was
not emphasized by the court. The important thing, as stressed by the court, was
that he was absent under such circumstances that the relationship had not been
severed. Does the court apply strictly the rules as to master and servant or does the
court apply the rules less harshly in order to effect the apparent intention of the
testator? In other words are the courts more inclined to be liberal in finding an
employee-employer relationship in cases of bequests to employees?
The employee-employer relationship is of course a relationship arising out of a
contract. 2 As such it may include such provisions and make such qualifications in
respect to emergencies as the parties may desire. It is quite often said that in order
for the relationship to exist the servant must be under the control of the master, that
the employer must be able to direct the servant and exercise supervision over him.3
While this is generally true it is not an essential element in that it must be always
present. The relationship may still exist although the control and direction is
temporarily dispensed with and the employee is not rendering actual service or being
paid.4 An employee is still an employee while he is on leave of absence or temporarily
ill. In an early English case5 the employee was absent from employment for some
time, permission having been given him. For this time he was not paid. The question
was whether he was in the service of the employer within the meaning of a certain
legislative act. The court ruled that the master had dispensed with his services during
this period, but that he was still in his service. In Peopie v. Lynch' a civil service
employee was given an indefinite leave of absence on account of illness. The question
was whether she had been separated from the service within the meaning of the act
which prohibited rehiring persons who had been so separated for more than a year.
It was held that the employee had been merely on leave of absence. The court said,
"If the relator had a right to return to the service at any minute she was no more
separated from it than an employee on an ordinary, two weeks vacatiop." 7 An
employee remains an employee although he may be temporarily not at work; for
instance if the employment is such that it cannot be continued during severe rains.8
A contract of employment is generally terminated by continuing sickness or
permanent disability of the employee.' However, the parties may contract to the
contrary."8 In an Indiana case1 the employee became ill and was able to work only
2. Harrell v. Atlas Portland Cement Co., 250
Fed. 83, 162 C. C. A. 255 (1918); Rogers v. Rogers, 70

5. King v. Parish of lslipp, 1 Stra. 423, 11 Mod.
Rep. 341.92 E. R. 863 (1796).

Ind. App. 659, 122 N. E. 778 (1919); New v. McMillan,
79 Okla. 70, 191 Pac. 160 (1920).
3. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S.518, 10
S. Ct. 175, 33 L. Ed. 440 (1889); Mound City Paint,
etc., Co. v. Conlon, 92 Mo. 221, 4 SW 922 (1887);
Spelman v. Delano, 177 Mo. App. 28, 163 SW 300
(1914); Kiser v. Suppe, 133 Mo. App. 19, 112 SW
1005 (1908); Alabama Fuel Co. v. Smith, 203 Ala. 70,
82 S 30 (1919); Employer's Indemnity Co. v. Kelly
Coal Co., 149 Ky. 712, 149 SW 992 (1912); McNamara v. Leipzig, 227 NY 291, 125 NE 244 (1919).
4. Industrial Trust Co. v. Alves etal., 46 R.I. 16,
124 Atl. 260 (1924).

6. People v. Lynch, 149 NYS 895, 164 App. Div.
517 (1914).
7. People v. Lynch, supra note 6.
8. In re Cowell's Estate, 170 Cal. 364, 149 Pae,
809(1915).
9. Williams v. Butler, 58 Ind. App. 47, 105 NE
387 (1914); O'Connor v. Briggs, 182 Mass. 387, 65
NE 836 (1903); Macauley v. Press Pub. Co., 170
App. Div. 640, 155 N. Y. S.1044 (1915).
10. Egan v. Winnipeg Baseball Club, 96 Minn.
345, 104 NW 947 (1905).
11. Red Cross Mfg. Co. v. Stroop, 79 Ind. App.
532,135 NE 351 (1922).
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four days between February 11th and April 14th. The parties had agreed that there
should be no deductions for time lost. The court held that although generally the inability of an employee by reason of sickness to perform his part absolves both parties
and terminates the relationship, yet the parties can contract differently.
Thus the relationship is one subject to such conditions as the parties may see
fit to impose. Absent a provision providing for such an event, and, absent an agreement or understanding by the parties to the opposite effect, an abandonment by
the employee will terminate the employment. 2 This is true even though the employee is not to blame for his absence.'3 So in the principal case if Engle had merely
abandoned work to join the army the relationship would have been ended. This is the
exact situation in Marshall v. Granville.14 However, the parties can contract so as to
continue the relationship as has been seen. This is sometimes quite difficult to
determine for the contract may be one to resume services after the period of absence
and not one of continuing employment. 15
We may now consider the principal case and other cases as to bequests to employees, in order to determine whether these cases can be explained in the light of
the above considerations or whether they depend upon a separate and distinct
rule applicable to wills, by which rule, the employee-employer relationship is more
easily found. It is believed that the majority of the cases can be explained on the
basis that the relationship actually exists, althbugh it will be seen that some cases
seem to show a liberal tendency in finding such a relationship.
In the principal case much evidence was introduced to show the attitudeof the
testator towards Engle, that he was considered as absent but that he would return
to resume his duties, etc. One witness testified that the testator considered his men
in the service just the same as when in his employ. Though the evidence is contradictory as to this, the following statement shows quite well the position of the Court
of Appeals. "It seems clear that the court (lower court) proceeded upon the theory
that no leave of absence could be granted the employee which would retain him in the
relation or status mentioned in the will, or, on the theory that taking all of the
testimony for the appellant (Engle) as true it did not show the granting of a leave of
absence. The pleadings were sufficient to present the issue, and in our view the evidence warranted the verdict."' 6 The jury had found the issues in favor of Engle;
that the employment had not been terminated.
The court relies on the English case, In re Cole. 7 That case is similar in facts
to the principal case; the question being whether the legatee remained in the employ
of the company within the terms of the bequest. The court said, "The question
whether he is in the employment of the company is not the same thing as the question whether he is in fact rendering actual service to the company. '""8 Evidence
was introduced to show that neither the legatee or the officers of the company intended
or desired to terminate the relationship. The position of the court is best shown by
this statement, "The intention here is that the employment should continue but
that there should be a temporary dispensation of obligation to render services."
This court rests its decision upon an earlier English case. 9 In that case the legacy
was left to A, if in the testator's service at the time of his decease. It appeared that
12. Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382,
116 NE 801 (1917); Nash v. H. R. Gladding Co.
118 Mich. 529, 77 NW 7 (1898); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 150, 103 SW
423 (1907).
13. Leopold et al v. Salkey, 89 Ill. 412 (1878).

14.
K. B.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Mardhall v. Granville, 2 K. B. 87, 86 L. J.
767 (1917).
Inre Drake, 2 Ch.99 (1920).
Hovey v. Grier, supra note I at 1066.
In re Cole, 1 Ch. 218 (1919).
In re Cole, supra note 17 at 223.
Herbert v. Reid, 16 Ves. 481 (1810).
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other members of the household had sent the servant, A, away so that he was not
actually rendering services at the time of the testator's death. The court stated,
"There was evidence from the testator himself, that notwithstanding appearances
the plaintiff was still in his service." 2 The employment was held not to be ended.
A later English case is that of In re Drake.2 1 There the bequest was of certain gums
in proportion to periods of employment; for ten years a certain amount; for five
years a certain amount, etc. The question was whether certain periods spent by
some of the employees in the army could be included. The court held that this
could not be done, saying that the facts of In re Cole were altogether different, for
in this case there was no evidence that the parties intended the employment to
continue but that rather they entered merely into a contract to re-hire the parties
upon their return. The case recognizes the soundness of In re Cole's Estate, but
under its different facts seems quite right.
There are but few American cases involving similar facts. The court in the
principal case discusses two such cases. In the case entitled In re Thompson's Estate22 , the testatrix gave to each person not named in her will, who had been in
her employment ten years or more immediately preceding her decease, ten thousand
dollars, and to each person so employed for five years or more five thousand dollars.
Thomas Chappel, a chauffeur, had entered the army after his employment had begun.
The question was whether this period should be included. The matter is very briefly
dealt with and few facts are given which are helpful. The court in disposing of this
bequest states that Mrs. Thompson gave Chappel a "leave of absence" for services in
the World War and that he must be deemed to have been five years in her service
and entitled to the legacy. Another employee had been employed for ten years but
two months before the death of the testatrix, had become paralyzed and was removed to a hospital. Pursuant to the directions of Mrs. Thompson he was placed
upon half pay. The court after stating that the employee had not been discharged,
held that he was entitled to the bequest. This later position may seem rather extreme, for probably no formal discharge was needed to terminate the employment."1
It seems that the former bequest was correctly allowed if the chauffeur was granted
a leave of absence as stated by the court.
24
The second case considered by the Court of Appeals is In re Mitchell's Estate.
The bequest was of five hundred dollars to each of the testator's servants in his
employ at the time of his death, who had been so employed for not less than one
year preceding his death. Mary Broderick had been employed for some fourteen
months but during the period had been obliged to go to a hospital for four months.
The court ruled that she was entitled to the bequest. The court said that although
her salary was not paid during the four months the testator had paid her hospital
expenses, which were in excess of her wages, had not discharged her and that she was
excusably absent. While this may be enough to show that the employment was not
ended the court also made the following statement, "It is neither in harmony with
the spirit of his will, nor his generous treatment of her that she should be deprived
of this small legacy." This seems to indicate that the court would be willing to
"stretch a point" in order to find the employee-employer relationship, so as to uphold
the bequest.
A similar attitude is shown in a Rhode Island Case. 5 The bequest was to Ada
Rice if she should be in the employ of Mrs. Lewis at the termination of a trust.
20. Herbert v. Reid, supra note 19 at 485.
21.
In re Drake, 2 Ch. 99 (1920).
22.
In re Thompson's Estate, 213 N. Y. S. 426,
126 Misc. Rep. 91 (1925).
23. Supra Note 9.

24. In re Mitchell's Estate, 186 N. Y. S. 666,
114 Misc. Rep. 370.
25. Abbott v. Lewis et al., 77 N. H. 94, 88 AtI.
98 (1913).
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Because of illness she was forced to discontinue further service and she later returned
to her home in Nova Scotia. Mrs. Lewis frequently had expressed a desire that she
return. It was held that she had not been discharged and that the evidence tended
to prove merely a temporary absence on account of illness. The court then said,
"The relation of confidence and friendship which would be implied from continued
employment still existed, and as itwas not understood that the employment was
definitely terminated,upon the facts stated the maid is entitled to the legacy."2
One other case has been found, that of Industrial Trust Co. v.Alves et al.2"
The testator gave one thousand dollars to each servant in his employment at the
time of his decease, who had been so employed for at least six months. One, Sotel,
at the time of the death of the testator and for three months before, was working
at the greenhouse. During the three months directly preceding that he had not
worked full time, though it seemed he had worked at certain times. The court held
that although he had not been engaged in actual work for a good portion of the time
that he did not thereby lose his status as an employee, as he was at all times, "subject to the call of the testator." He was held to be entitled to the bequest. It seems
that under the facts the employee-employer relationship existed.
While some of the cases seem to show a liberal tendency by which the courts are
more likely to find the fact of employment, yet it seems that the cases on the whole
may be supported on the grounds that the relationship actually exists. This seems
to be true as to the principal case. Engle claimed that it was agreed that his going
into the army would not terminate his contract of employment and evidence was
introduced to show this. The jury found the issues in his favor and it seems the Court
of Appeals was entirely right in holding that the lower court was wrong in rendering
judgment against Engle and in favor of Celia Poinsett.
W.

WIMMELL*

*LL.B., 1930.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-SUFFICIENCY OF DESCRIPTION OF
AUTOMOBILE IN RECORDED MORTGAGE TO GIVE CONSTRUCTIVE
NOTICE TO THIRD PERSONS. First Nat. Bank of Brookfieid v. Gardner et al.1
A dealer in automobiles executed two mortgages on a car. Both mortgages
correctly described the body, style and number of cylinders, but the prior recorded
mortgage recited the wrong motor and factory numbers, and it was held not to be
entitled to priority over the subsequently recorded mortgage which was correct in
every respect except that it described the model as "K" when it was in fact "R".
The prior recorded instrument recited the motor and factory numbers respectively
as 14L39208 and 19835, ;he correct numbers being 14L39206 and L19835.
For a chattel mortgage to be valid as between the parties thereto it must contain
such an identification of the property that the mortgagee may say with a reasonable
degree of certainty what it is that is the subject of his lien.2 A more stringent test
26. Abbott v. Lewis et al., supra note 25 at 98,
88 Atl. 100.
27. Industrial Trust Co. v. Alves et al., 46 R. I.
16, 124 Atl. 260 (1924).
1. 5 S.W. (2d) 1115 (Mo. App. 1928).
2. Security Nat. Bank v. White Co., 50 S. D. 598,
211 N. W. 452 (1926) (description insufficient to give
the mortgage validity as between the parties). In the
following cases the descriptions of cars were held
sufficient to give validity to the mortgages as between

the parties: Humphreys Say. Bank v. Carpenter et

al., 213 Mo. App. 390, 2S0 S. W. 618 (1923); Clark v.
Ford et al., 179 Ky. 797, 201 S. W. 344 (1918);
Owen v. George Cole Motor Co., 292 S. W. 1 (Tenn
1927); Smith v. Farmers' State Bank, 262 S. W. 835
(Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Hardinget al.
v. Jesse Dennett
Inc. et al., 17 S. W. (2d) 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929);
Alder v. Godfrey, 153 Wisc. 186, 140 N. W. 1115
(1913); see Walker v. Fitzgerald et al.,
157 Minn. 319,
324, 196 N. W. 269 (1923), reargument 197 N. W.:259
(1924).

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES

however is applied where the validity of the mortgage is questioned by third persons
not parties to it. It is unanimously held that a description in a recorded chattel
mortgage is sufficient to give constructive notice to subsequent parties if it invites
and suggests inquiries which will enable third persons to identify the property.3
The court in the Principal case pointed out the difference between a misdescription or false description and an incomplete description accurate so far as it goes.
While a meager description suggests inquiry, a false description just in so far as it is
complete, will be taken as accurate and will suggest that there is no need for further
inquiry. In the case under discussion there was a false description which on its face
appeared to be complete, and this, coupled with the fact that mortgagor was a dealer
in cars, is a sound basis for the decision. In two other cases in which the
facts were
4
substantially the same as in the principal case, a like result was reached.
In the instant case the court said, in pointing out the significance of the fact
that mortgagor was a dealer, "There may be a distinction between the case at bar, a
dealer giving a mortgage upon an automobile, and an individual, especially if the
individual owns but one car of that make. In the case at bar it must be remembered
that there are many cars of that make dealt in by the dealer. Many cars owned and
sold by the dealer have the same outward aspects, and the only means of identification would be the numbers. There were doubtless cars made and sold that had the
very numbers contained in the false description. We think that for the protection
of third persons the description in chattel mortgages as to factory or motor number
must be accurate." From the court's concluding sentence, however, it appears the
same result would probably have been reached if mortgagor had been an individual
owning but one car, but query. It might be argued in that event, and not without
some little force, that a reasonably diligent third person would surely make inquiries.
In First Mortgage Loan Co. v. Durfee et al.' the description in the mortgage was,
"One Ford automobile, model T, 1918. Type of body, sedan. Number 3558516,
3. First Nat. Bank of Brookfield v. Gardner et al.,
5 S. W. (2d) 1115 (Mo. App. 1928); Iowa Automobile
Supply Co., v. Tapley, 186 Iowa 1341, 171 N. W.
710 (1919); Iowa Say. Bank v. Graham et al., 192
Iowa 96, 181 N. W. 771 (1921); Stiles et al. v. City
State Bank, 56 Okla. 572, 156 Pac. 622 (1916);
Nelson v. Robinson et al., 48 S. D. 436, 205 N. W.
40 (1925); Wright v. Lindsay, 92 Vt. 335. 104 Atl.
148 (1918); Sargent, Osgood and Roundy Co. v.
Kelly et al., 99 Vt. 350, 132 Ad. 135 (1926); Mack
International Motor Truck Corp. v. Jones and
Combs et al., 149 SE544 (Va. App. 1929); Jones,
Chattel Mortgages (2d ed. 1883) sec. 54.
4. Wise v. Kennedy, 248 Mass. 83, 142 N. E.
755 (1924) (Mortgagor was a dealer and the description in the mortgage stated the serial number of the
car to be 6552 when it was 6557); McQueen et al. v.
Tenison 177 S. W. 1053 (Tex. 1915) (In addition to
reciting the wrong factory number, 32466, the correct
number being 2466, the description stated thaL the
car was a 4-passenger Maxwell when it was in fact a
S-passenger. The mortgagor was the Dallas Automobile Clearing House Ass'n, which no doubt puts
it in a class with dealers, but the court reached its
decision without mentioning this point.)
In Exchange Nat. Bank v. Palace Car Co., 1 La.
App. 307 (1926), and in Alberts v. Alberta et al., 221
N. W. 80 (S. D. 1928) the description in the mort-

gages contained the wrong motor numbers, and it was
held that the recorded instruments did not give
constructive notice to third persons.
The description in Wright v. Lindsay, 92 Vt. 335,
104 Atl. 148 (1918) was "One Ford touring auto,
model T, serial number 621120 - --------- now in
the possession of said Baldwin in Newport, Vt.,
and being the only property of this kind now owned by
said Baldwin." The court held this was a sufficient
record to give constructive notice to subsequent
parties, although there were at least five different
serial numbers of principal parts of the car, and a
plate on the dash on which were the wordi, "Manufacturer's number of this car is 593350." The serial
No. in the mortgage was the No. on the engine.
In the following cases the description contained
among other things the correct engine number, and
it was held sufficient: Sowards et al. v. Jones, 75
Colo. 25, 223 Pac. 747 (1924); Iowa Say. Bank v.
Graham et al., 192 Iowa 96, 181 N. W. 771 (1921).
But of course, the number alone is not sufficient.
In Valley Securities Co. v. Stafford, 8 La. App. 607
(1928) it wa's held that the description, "One roadster
number 14525832" was not sufficient as affecting
third persons to mortgage a Ford roadster of the same
motor number.
5. 193 Iowa 1142, 188 N. W. 777 (1922).
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serial number ..................... Number of cylinders, 4." The court held this record did
not put the subsequent purchaser of a car number 2558516 on inquiry into the possibility whether by some mistake the two numbers were intended to identify the
same car, for to hold that it did would destroy the protection which the statute
affords to subsequent purchasers. This decision has been criticized for requiring
perhaps undue exactness of the description.' It was suggested that the startling
similarity of the numbers and the size and evenness of the error should be sufficient to
put a third person on inquiry, especially in view of the fact that not many individuals
would have several cars of like description, and not even dealers would be in the
least likely to have two cars whose factory numbers were an even million apart.
Perhaps there is some merit to this criticism, but where is the line to be drawn
-between correct numbers and incorrect numbers?
It is believed that once a court rules that an incorrect number will be an adequate description to give constructive notice, that such a holding will be bound to
lead to confusion and difficulty. For example, let it be supposed that an automobile's
motor number is 425, and that the automobile is correctly described in every respect except that its motor number is recited to be 525. Possibly in that particular
case a careful searcher of the records might suspect that there was a mere typographical error, and might be put on inquiry. But suppose the number had been stated to
be 452 or 542. Would the searcher again be put on inquiry? A court would be
treading on dangerous ground should it attempt to hold that some misstatements of
numbers would put a party on inquiry while others would not. As a matter of fact
no court has gone so far as to say that a description which recites the wrong motor
number will give constructive notice to third persons.'
It has sometimes been held that a false recital in description of the mortgaged
property can be rejected, and the rest of the description, if sufficient, will give constructive notice to third persons. Perhaps this is a corollary to the rule that the whole
description must be considered together.8 In Wise v. Kennedy' the question was
raised whether a false recital of the number of the mortgaged car could not thus be
treated as surplusage, and the remainder of the description held adequate. In that
case the description of the mortgaged property was, "One new Jordan touring car
No. 6552." The court said that if the number were rejected the description would
then be insufficient to give constructive notice, for it would not satisfy the require.
ment that the description must distinguish the subject-matter of the mortgage from
other property of the same class."
While the motor or factory number is undoubtedly one of the most important
elements in the- description of a car, and if misstated will in the vast majority of
6. (1923) 8 Iowa L. Bull. 268.
7. In Alberts v. Alberts et al., 221 N. W. 80
(S. D. 1928) the property covered by the mortgage
was described as "One Ford coupe, engine number
1149529" The correct number was 11495528. The
court held that the mortgage was ineffectual as against
parties taking a subsequent mortgage, and said,
quoting from Security Nat. Bank v. White Co., 50
S. D. 598, 211 N. W. 452 (1926), "In the matter of
chattel mortgages on stock and other property not
susceptible of such description as would absolutely
distinguish the property mortgaged from other
property of the same class, this court has been less
strict than some other courts in its requirements for
the creation of a valid lien. But such decisions have
no application to cases involving an absolute misdescription of property susceptible of accurate de-

scription." The court uses language so strong as to
indicate that it probably would hold invalid as to
third persons any description which recited the wrong
motor or engine number.
8. First Nat. Bank of Brookfield v. Gardner et al.
5 S. W. (2d) 1115 (Mo. App. 1928); Wright v.
Lindsay, 92 Vt. 335, 104 AtI. 148 (1918); Sargent,
Osgood and Roundy Co. v. Kelly et al.. 99 Vt. 350,
132 AtI. 135 (1926).
9. 248 Mass. 83, 142 N. E. 755. (1924).
10. Commercial Say. Bank v. Brooklyn Lumber
and Grain Co. et al., 178 Iowa 1206, 160 N. W. 817
(1917); Iowa Auto Supply Co. v. Tapley, 186 Iowa
1341, 171 N. W. 710 (1919); Hauseman Motor Co.
et al. v. Napierella, 223 Ky. 433, 3 S. W. (2d) 1084
(1928).
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cases if not in all of them prevent the record from giving constructive notice, it is not
indispensable to the validity of the mortgage as against third persons. Other elements may lend adequate particularity to the description. If the mortgage states
that the car is the only one mortgagor has answering the description, this is enough
to distinguish the car from other cars of the same class." Also a statement of the
location of the car seems to be sufficient for that purpose.' 2 Where both these elements appear in the description it is adequate without a doubt.13 Where the description contains neither 4of these elements nor the motor or factory or serial number
it is probably insufficient.
Suppose the description in the mortgage recites the wrong motor number, but
in addition thereto gives the location of the car and states that it is the only one of its
kind mortgagor owns. Would the rule suggested and discussed above, namely, that
of treating the number as surplusage, apply? It is believed that a court might hold
either way, depending on the particular circumstances of the case. No case dealing
with this state of facts has been found.
In the case of Nelson v. Robinson el at." the mortgage stated that the car was
the property of the mortgagor and in his possession, and gave the make and type of
the car. It was held that this description was constructive notice to a subsequent
purchaser. The court stated that, "If a person of ordinary prudence, acting in good
faith, and making the inquiries suggested by the mortgage, would have been enabled
to identify the mortgaged property, the description is sufficient." In pointing out
the objectionableness of being too exacting of descriptions the court said, ".... this
court will bear in mind that the requirement of accuracy in description is not to
enable those who are not actually misled to deal in mortgaged property relying on
technical defects to defeat the claims of the mortgagee." The soundness of this
suggestion is, of course, unquestionable, but its practical force is doubtful. Furthermore, lax requirements invite the so-called technical defects.
A few courts seem to recognize and attach some significance to the fact that an
automobile is a chattel which c an be minutely described. In Iowa Automobile Suppiy
Co. v. Tapley. 6 the bill of sale described the car as a seven passenger Colby automobile then in the possession of W. A. Walford in the county of Polk and state of
Iowai, The court, holding this description insufficient to give constructive notice,
11. Hicks v. Walker Brothers Co., 31 Ga. App.
395, 120 S. E. 694 (1923) ("One 1,4-ton Kissel truck"
plus an inference from the evidence that mortgagor
had but one such truck); see Commercial Say. Bank
v. Brooklyn Lumber and Grain Co. et al., 178 Iowa
1206, 160 N. W. 817 (1917) Court said that if it had
been asserted in the description that the vehicle
was the only one or one of several owned by or in the
possession of mortgagor in the place named, this
would have distinguished the vehicle from its class).

12. Stiles et al v. City State Bank, 56 Okla. 572,
156 Pac. 622 (1916) (The only thing which resembled
a statement of location was a provision in the mortgage that the property should not be removed from
Oklahoma County. All of the description added to

this was "Three new Michigan Automobiles, forty
horse power, No-------- The decision goes far).
Nelson v. Robinson et al., 48 S. D. 436, 205 N. W. 40
(1925) (parallels the above case); Mack International
Motor Truck Corp. v. Jones and Combs et al., 149
S. E. 544 (Va. App. 1929) (county of location stated).
Contra: Iowa Automobile Supply Co. v. Tapley, 186

Iowa 1341, 171 N. W. 710 (1919) (Statement of
county of location held not to narrow down the location sufficiently to differentiate the car from its class.;)
see Commercial Say. Bank v. Brooklyn Lumber and
Grain Co. et al., 178 Iowa 1206, 160 N. W. 817 (1917)
(Said by way of dictum that if the statement of location had been correct, it might have saved the instrument otherwise invalid as to third persons.).
13.
Sargent, Osgood and Roundy Co. v. Kelly
et al., 99 Vt. 350, 132 AtI. 135 (1926).
14. Walker v. Fitzgerald et al., 157 Minn. 319,
196 N. W. 269 (1923), reargument 157 Minn. 323,
197 N. W. 259 (1924).
15. 48 S. D. 436, 205 N. W. 40 (1925). The name
of the car appearing in the mortgage was "Norwark."
The real name was "Norwalk."
The court, holding
the description would put any prudent man on inquiry, said, "No reasonable man would place any
reliance in the variation of a single letter, without
appreciable effect on the sound being produced by
the variation."
16. 186 Iowa 1341, 171 N. W. 710 (1919).
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employed the following language: "As a matter of common knowledge auto cars
generally bear registry numbers and factory numbers, and have the marks of individual identification by which they may be designated with reasonable particularity,
and he who takes and records a lien on one of them without noting something by
which it may be differentiated from others in its class has only himself to blame
if he thereby permits a subsequent purchaser to obtain precedence over him."
Another court in asserting that the best description of a motor vehicle is the name of
manufacturer, the model and the factory or motor number, said, "It is a matter of
common knowledge that automobiles are thus described when sold, mortgaged or
insured. It is the only description which furnishes reasonable means of identification.
It is 17easy to give, is definite and certain, and has generally been adopted by the public."

In support of its decision holding a false recital of the serial number fatal to

the description of the car the court in Wise v. Kennedy' 8 said, "It is common knowledge ..... that atiromobiles of various nechanical designs, made by numerous manufacturers under multiform trade-names, are constantly in the market for purchase
and sale, and that cars of any one of the makers can be distinguished with reasonable
certainty from other automobiles of the same class only by the numbers by which
each car is designated." While nope of these excerpts go so far as to say that motor
or factory numbers are indispensable to a valid description as against third persons, they at least indicate that some courts are wont to recognize the fact that an
automobile is susceptible of a complete differentiation from its class, and to require
accordingly a more detailed description of automobiles than of other chattels.
Query if courts should not go the full length, requiring the mortgage description
of a car to be complete in itself. It is easier for mortgagees to be accurate and
thorough in their descriptions than it is for third persons to run down every clue
which an incomplete or inaccurate description appears to suggest. Furthermore, the
general rule that a description is sufficient to give constructive notice if it suggests
inquiries which will enable third persons to identify the property, had its inception
at a date prior to the age of automobiles. The basis or justification for the rule lay
in the fact that generally if not always it was impossible for the description in the
mortgage to be complete and adequate in itself. This is clearly not true when
the subject matter of the mortgage is an automobile. So it appears mortgages on
automobiles should be taken out of the general rule, the reason therefor not obtaining.
G. C.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF

STATUTES

MAKING TESTIMONY CONCLUSIVE, O'Donneil v. Wells.'
In the recently decided case of O'Donnell v. Wells, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that since a legislative assembly is without power to prescribe what shall
constitute proof of a fact, a city law-making body cannot prescribe what shall be
conclusive evidence of negligence in an action for wrongful death. It is proposed
here to examine those statutes by means of which various legislatures have attempted to influence fact determination in the courts, and to determine the constitution17. Walker v. Fitzgerald et al., 157 Minn. 319,
196 N. W. 269 (1923), reargument 157 Minn. 323,
197 N. W. 259 (1924).

18.

248 Mass. 83, 142 N. W. 755 (1924).

1. 21 SW (2d) 762 (1929)
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ality thereof. As we are concerned primarily with the power of the legislature, it
will be necessary for our purposes to understand exactly the effect of a particular
statute before we can determine whether the legislature has encroached upon the
functions of the judiciary.
Such statutes can be classified into these categories: 2 (1) those which provide
that where fact A is shown to exist, fact B is conclusively presumed to exist, which,
in effect, change the-substantive law: (2) those that declare that proof of fact A
shall be conclusive evidence of fact B, the substantive law remaining unchanged;
(3) those which provide that certain evidence shall be sufficient to take a case to the
jury for their determination; (4) and finally those which make fact A presumptive
evidence of fact B, such presumption being rebuttable. Each type of statute will be
separately considered.
As to those statutes which provide that where fact A is shown to exist, fact B is
conclusively presumed, it should be noted that such statutes can usually be construed
as amounting to a change in the substantive law. The legislature has not provided
that fact A shall be considered proof of fact B. It has made the existence of fact B
immaterial, and has established a rule of substantive law. To take a concrete case:
were the legislature to pass a statute providing that where breaking is shown,
entering is conclusively presumed, thus making the fact of entering irrebutable,
the legislature would have, in effect, enacted that the crime of burglarly shall henceforth consist of breaking only.3 The right and power of the legislature to change
the substantive law being supreme, subject only to constitutional restraints, it
follows that it is within the power of the legislature to change the substantive law
by means of a "conclusive presumption."
A leading case 4 which clearly establishes the power of the legislature to formulate
a conclusive presumption involves a statute the provision of which is "that the
surviving wife shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent upon her
husband" in actions under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The court, in this
case, used this language: "The legislature in declaring that a particular fact shall be
conclusively presumed does not establish a presumption in the ordinary sense of the
term, but rather a rule of law to the effect that in the case specified, the non-existence
of the fact presumed is immaterial. The legislature can make a presumption conclusive unless such presumption would cut off or impair some right given and protected by the constitution.6
Distinguishable from those cases in which we find a change in the substantive
law are those where the legislature has attempted to prescribe what shall constitute
conclusive evidence of a given fact. In other words, we deal now, not with a statute
which provides that fact B shall be "conclusively presumed" from evidence of fact A,
but with those statutes and ordinances which purport to instruct the court as to
2. Another type of statute may be mentioned in
this connection; i. e., those statutes which make the
findings of particular administrative bodies final
as to questions of fact and not subject to judicial
review. But the problem of administrative finality
involves complications beyond the scope of the
present discussion. In this connection, see: FindleyKehl Inv. Co. v. O'Connor, 256 SW 798 (1923); Stalte
ex rel v. Atkinson, 271 Mo. 28, 195 SW 741 (1917);
Dickiiison, Administrative Justice 'nd the Supremah:y
of Law.
3. See State v. LaPointe, 81 NH 227, 234, 123
Atl. 692, 31 ALR 1212 (1924).

4. State ex rel v. District Court, 139 Minn. 409,
166 NW 772 (1918). Accord: Daggs v. Ins. Co., 136
Mo. 382, 28 SW 85 (1896); St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v.
Mathews, 165 US 1, 17 Supt. Ct. 243, 41 L. Ed. 611
(1896); Feagain v. Di'k, Assn, 202 Ky 801, 261 SW
607 (1924). Contra: Little Rock & S. F. R. Co. v.
Payne, 33 Ark. 816 (1878).
5. For example, the state would have no power to
enact that election to office shall be conclusively
presumed from a certificate of election. The constitution provides that the number of votes shall
determine the election. Attorney-General v. Barstow,
4 Wise. 567, 792 (1855), 2 Wigmore on Evidence (2d),
section 1351, 1353.
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what shall be considered proof. Where there is no constitutional restraint on the
power of the legislature, and where the legislature has not clearly indicated its intention otherwise, such statutes can usually be construed as effecting a change in the
substantive law, and, therefore, valid. But where the legislature has clearly indicated that the substantive law is to remain unchanged, then the question as to the
power of such an assembly to determine what shall be considered proof of a fact arises.
In the principal case of O'Donneh v. Wells,' the ordinance provided, in part, that
"evidence that a person has driven a motor vehicle for a distance of one city block
at a speed of twenty-five miles per hour shall be considered proof of careless and
negligent driving." The court construed the ordinance to mean that proof of fact A
shall be conclusive evidence of fact B, and that the ordinance did not involve,
therefore, a change in the substjantive law. In such a case the legislative body has
not changed the substantive law; it has not modified the common law of torts.
On the contrary it clearly indicates that carelessness or negligence shall remain
the basis of liability, and then proceeds to prescribe what shall constitute proof of
negligence.'- Though the difference between this type of statute and the ones providing for a "conclusive presumption" may seem to be one merely of form, it is
believed, and the authorities generally sustain such belief, that there is a vital and
fundamental distinction. In the one case, the legislative body effects a change in the
substantive law, the right to do which is naturally not controverted. In the other
case, the legislature retains and adopts the common law basis of liability, and then encroaches on the province of the judiciary by prescribing what shall constitute proof.
There is no confusion in the cases upon this matter. When such statutes cannot
be construed as amounting to a change in the substantive law, the courts universlly
hold them to be unconstitutional 1 As Professor Wigmore says: "The judicial
function under the constitution is to apply the law in controverted cases; to apply
the law necessarily involves the determination of the facts; to determine the facts
necessarily involves the investigation of evidence as a basis for that determination.
To forbid investigations is to forbid the exercise of an indestructible judicial function.
To make a rule of conclusive evidence, compulsory upon the judiciary, is to attempt
an infringement upon their exclusive province. 8 "
That the legislature has the power to change the substantive law is clear.
That the legislature does not have the power to determine what shall constitute
"conclusive evidence," or proof, is equglly clear. There are two other types of
6. Supra note 1. In this case there was a municipal
ordinance involved, and not a statute. For the purpose of this discussion, the distinction between a
statute and a municipal ordinance is not material.
for if the state legislature has not the power io prescribe what shall constitute proof, a city law-making
body has no such power.
6a. It should be noted that the ordinance in the
case of O'Donnell v. Wells was penal in character.
Violation of such ordinance was punishable by fine.
It would seem that a violation of this odinance would
constitute negligence per se, according to the rules of
tort law. Propulonris v. Goebel Const. Co., 279 Mo.
258, 213 SW 792 (1919); Burt v. Nicholas, 264 Mo.
1, 15, 173 SW 681 (1914); Butz v. Cananaugh, 137
Mo. 503, 38 SW 1104, 59 Am. St. Rep. 504 (1897);
Brannock v. Elmose, 114 Mo. 55, 21 SW 451 (1892);
Dickson v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 491, 16 SW 381
(1891); Ashby v. Gravel Road Co., 99 Mo. App. 178,
185, 73 SW 229 (1903).
In such cases the courts

adopt, as a basis of civil liability, that standard of
care required by the statute or ordinance. In the
principal case, however, the ordinance was not dealt
with upon this basis; it was considered as a mandatory
rule of evidence. Though the language of the specific
provision in question might seem to justify such
construction, yet the ordinance remains penal in
character, a violation of which is usually considered
negligence per se.
7. Findley-Kehl Inv. Co. v. O'Connor, supra
note 2; State ex rel v. Davis, 302 Mo. 307, 315, 259
SW 80 (1923); State ex rel v. Atkinson, supra note 2;
Roth v. Gabbert, 123 Mo. 21, 27 SW 528 (1894);
Abbot v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 162 (1868); People v.
Love, 310 11. 558, 142 NW 204 (1924); State v.
Sixon, 77 W. Va. 243, 87 SW 267 (1915).
See:
Sellers v. State, 11 Okla. Crim. Rep. 588, 149 Pac.
1071 (1915); State v. Barrett, 138 N. C. 630, 50 SE
506, 1 L. R. A. (NS) 626 (1915).
8. 2 Wigmore on Evidence (2 ed), sec. 1353.
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statutes, however, that have caused a great amount of uncertainty and confusion in
the cases of various jurisdictions. These statutes provide, in effect: (1) that evidence
of fact A shall be prima facie evidence of fact B, and (2) that evidence of fact A shall
be presumptive evidence of fact B.
It is to be noted that the courts are by no means consistent in their definitions
of these terms. Some courts seem to consider them to be synonymous. In general,
however, it is considered that "prima facie" evidence is such evidence that would
justify reasonable men in finding to be true the fact which such evidence was offered
to prove; it is sufficient evidence to take a case to the jury, which might, then,
9
reasonably find the fact to be true or not true. "Presumptive" evidence, however, is
in the absence of proof to the confind,
must
jury
the
evidence of such weight that
trary, that the proposition for which such evidence was offered to prove, is true.
Where fact A is shown, fact B is true, unless there is proof to the contrary: that is a
presumption. The distinction between prima facie evidence and presumptive evidence is vital, and must be kept clearly in mind in determining the validity of the
statutes to be considered here. The problem here is to determine the constitutionality of each type of statute.
May the legislature, by statutory enactment, determine what shall constitute
prima facie evidence? It is generally said that the legislature has such authority
under its broad powers of regulating court procedure and the rules of evidence.
How far does this regulatory power extend? It has been held that a statute which
provided that in every case, whatever be the nature and sufficiency of the evidence,
the jury shall determine and decide the issue, was unconstitutional because it
attempted to deprive the courts of their exclusive power to pass upon the sufficiency
of the evidence.' 0 However, statutes which provide that proof of one fact shall be
prima facie evidence of another have been generally upheld.
One can find any number of cases sustaining the power of the legislature to
provide that proof of one fact shall be prima facie evidence of another." Frequently
one will find a statute which provides that "illegal possession" of intoxicating liquors
is an offence, followed by a provision that proof of possession shall be prima facie
evidence of illegality. Now if such statute be interpreted to mean that, upon a showing of the fact of possession, the jury shall be permitted to consider the illegality
thereof, it amounts to nothing more than a regulation of procedure, to which there is
no objection. And several jurisdictions consider this to be the proper application of
such statutes."
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has declared: "The power of the legislature to pass a statute making the possession of a certain amount of intoxicating
liquor prima facie evidence of an intent to violate the law against illegal sales is
supported by the authorities and text-book writers, and is based upon the right
of the legislature to change the rules of evidence, and upon the doctrine that an
accused person has no vested right in any presumption or ruje of evidence which the
9.

Due to the fact that the term "prima facie"

11.

State v. Cunningham, 25 Conn. 195; State v.

isused in varying meanings by the courts, it is nec-

O'Connell, 82 Me. 30, 19 Atl. 86 (1889); State v.

essary, in order to understand the position of a
particular court, to ascertain what is understood by

Intoxicating Liquors, 80 Me. 57, 12 Atl. 794 (1888);
State v. Barrett, supra note 7; State v. Stromberg, 14

N. D. 291, 103 NW 566 (1905); State v. LaPointe,
many courts say that the legislature can make fact supra note 3; People v. Cannay, 139 N. Y. 32, 34
A prima facie evidence of fact B,and then proceed to . NE 759, 36 Am. St. Rep. 668 (1893); Board of Excise
say that the jury must find fact B, in the absence v. Merchant, 103 N. Y.143,87 NE 484, 57 Am. Rep.
705 (1886); Sellers v.State, supra note 7.
of proof to the contrary-a true presumption.
12. State v. Cunningham, supra note 11; State v
10. Thoe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 181
Barrett, supra note 7; State v. LaPointe, supra note 3
Wisc. 456, 195 NW 407, 29 A. L. R. 1280 (1923).
that court to be the definition of the term. A great
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law-making power can not alter, within certain limits. When possession is shown,
then the legal presumption of guilt arises, and it devolves upon the accused to give a
satisfactory explanation. Such a statute does not make it obligatory upon the jury
to convict after presentation of such proof, but shifts upon the accused the duty to
explain. * * * *.When proof of a certain fact is made prima facie evidence of the
main fact to be established, the law does not mean that there is any presumption
of guilt thereby created, but that there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury, and
upon which they may convict, if there is no countervailing testimony. 3" This court,
then, upholds the statute on the ground that the legislature has the right to change
and to regulate court procedure.
Now while the courts agree upon this general proposition that it is within the
power of the legislature to change the rules of evidence and of procedure, their
interpretation of the scope of such power has, by no means, been uniform. Many
courts hold that the legislature, under this atthority, has the power not only to
determine what shall constitute prima facie evidence, but also has the right to determine what shall be presumptive evidence. These courts either give sanction to an
express presumption, or they interpret "prima facie" to mean "true, unless rebutted"
-which amounts to the same thing.
It must be admitted that, by the great weight of authority, the decisions favor
such a view. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that such statutes
do not violate the "due process" clause of the constitution. 14 Many state authorities
are in accord with the position of the Supreme Court."
The Supreme Court of Georgia recently used this language: "It is within the
power of the legislature to formulate rules of evidence, and, therefore, within the
legislative power not only to legalize as evidence a presumption that the insolvency
of a bank was caused by fraudulent acts of the officer directly charged with its
affairs, but also to place upon such officers the burden of rebutting this presumption. 6 " Generally speaking, the courts sustain such statutory presumptions by
holding that it is within the power of the legislature to regulate court procedure,
that the only effect of such statute is to "give a sort of artificial force" to the evidence, that the person against whom the evidence is offered still has the right of
having the facts determined by a court, and that he is not deprived of his right to
give evidence before a jury. These courts sustain statutes which provide that evidence of possession of intoxicating liquor shall be presumptive evidence that such
possession was illegal; they thus shift to the defendant the burden of producing
evidence to show that the possession was lawful.
It may be proper to inquire whether, conceding that the legislatures have the
power to establish both prima facie rules and also statutory presumptions, such rules
must be reasonable. Is it necessary that fact A be of such a nature as might reasonably create an inference of fact B? For example, could the legislature provide that
proof that a defendant was wearing a hat at the time of the injury shall be prima
13.

State v. Barrett, supra note 7.
14. Yee Hem v. U. S. 268 U. S. 178, 45 Sup. Ct.
470, 69 L. Ed. 904 (1924); Hawes v. Georgia, 258
U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 204, 66 L. Ed. 431 (1922).
15.
Youmans v. State, 7 Ga. App. 101 (1909);
People v. Love, supra note 7; State v. Intoxicating
Liquors, 109 Iowa 145, 80 NW 230 (1899); Shanlian v.
Equitable Co., 226 Mass. 67, 115 NE 46 (1917);
Gillespie v. State, 96 Miss. 856, 513 So. 811, 926

676 (1897); Katz v. Eldredge, 96 N. J. Law 382, 118

(1910); Rosenfeld v. Jayways, 67 Mont. 558, 216 P
766 (1923); Durfee v. State, 53 Nebr. 214, 73 NW

Missouri would give effect to a statutory presumption.
16. Youmans v. State, supra note 15.

Atl. 242 (1921); People v. Molland, 222 N. Y. 456,
119 NE 102, 4 A. L. R. 463 (1918); State v. Humphrey,
42SD512,
176 NW 39 (1920); Scott v.
Commonwealth, 121 Va. 812 (1917).
It is difficult
to ascertain the Missouri view on this question.
While the phrase "prima facie" is frequently used,
it remains undefined. The implication of the case of
O'Donnell v. Wells, supra note 1, is that the courts of
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facie evidence that such defendant was guilty of negligence? The authorities quite
generally hold that such rules of procedure and of evidence must be subjected to
the test of rationality. 7 In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently
held that an arbitrary presumption violates the "due process" clause of the constitution."x One eminent text-writer contends that the reasonableness of such rules
should not be subject to judicial review, that it is a matter exclusively for the legislature to determine.' It is to be noted, however, that the only authorities cited are
contra to his position.
To return to the question whether the legislature has, or should have, the power to
establish a true presumption, it is to be noticed that the effect of such presumptions
is to require the defendant to come forward with'evidence in rebuttal of the fact
presumed, or else have the fact found against him. The question then arises: does the
constitution guarantee only that a person shall have a right to give evidence before a
jury, and that he shall have the right to a determination of the facts by such jury?
It would seem that the constitutional guarantees extend farther. One has the additional right not to give any evidence. In criminal cases, the accused has the undoubted right to refuse absolutely to utter a word in his behalf, or to give any other evidence at the trial; he has the right to require the state to prove every element of
the crime with which he is charged. And as it is beyond the power of the state
directly to require a defendant to give evidence in his behalf, it would seem that it
would necessarily follow that the state could not accomplish the same result by the
indirect procedure of establishing a presumption against such defendant. And in
civil cases, it is suggested that it is not the function of the legislature to determine
the sufficiency of evidence. That would seem to be the exclusive function of the
court.
Mr. Justice Peaslee, in State v. LaPointe,20 attacks the power of the legislature
to establish presumptions in the following language: "The broader interpretation
of such statutes impairs the defendant's undoubted right to insist that he can not be
convicted except upon evidence produced against him. If it were to be called a rule
of evidence, it would be invalid because it would undertake to invade the judicial
sphere, by prescribing the weight to certain evidence. Treated as a rule of procedure,
it undertakes to compel the defendant to produce evidence, or else have a question
of fact decided against him, as though it were one of law. To stress this so-called
privilege of the defendant to produce evidence, as so many courts have stressed it, is
an entire perversion of the protection guaranteed to him. It is true it is his right to
produce evidence, but it is equally true that he cannot be compelled to do so, whether
directly or indirectly.* * * It is his constitutional right not to produce evidence.
Were it not for the array of cases denying the substance of this privilege, it would
seem incredible that anyone could suppose that it could be invaded by any legislation based upon a power to penalize the exercise of a right. Giving to him the right to
produce evidence, or not, is no substitute for his right not to produce it .... Certainly this argument is sound. But the courts have quite generally sustained the
power of the legislatures to establish such presumptions, both in civil and in criminal
cases.
J. A. L.
17.
(1920);
(1896);
(1893);
(1928).

State v. Gremmett, 33 Ida. 203, 193
State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 44
People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32, 34
State v. Price, 175 N. C. 804, 95

Pac. 380
NE 949
NE 759
SE 478

18. Manley v. State, 279 U. S.1,49 Sup. Ct. 215,
73 L. Ed. 575 (1928).
19. 2 Wigmore on Evidence (2 ed), sec. 1356.
20. Supra note 3.
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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF ONE SPOUSE AS AFFECTING A
JOINT ACTION BY BOTH OR AN ACTION BY THE SURVIVING SPOUSE
FOR THE DEATH OF THEIR INFANT CHILD UNDER SECTION 4217 OF
MISSOURI REVISED STATUTES (1919). Carney v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry.
Co.' and Herrell v. Si. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.'
These cases involve a discussion of the doctrine of imputed negligence. In
Carney v. Ry.., the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the negligence of the wife
in going on the track in front of i fast approaching train would not bar the husband's
action for the death of his infant child which the wife was carrying. Section 4217
of the Revised Statutes of 1919 expressly states that the mother and father have
a joint action for the death of their unmarried minor children; or if either parent
be dead, then the survivor may bring the action. As the mother and child were killed,
the husband alone had an action for the death of his infant child in this case. In
Herreil v. fly., the Supreme Court held that a plea of contributory negligence of the
father alone was not a defense to a joint action by the father andmother for the
wrongful death of their unmarried minor son under section 4217. In this case the
defendant urged that the failure of the father to look and warn his son of the approaching train while the son was driving his father's car was a defense to the joint
action or at least to the father's share of the judgment.
By prior Missouri cases it has been held that a plea of contributory negligence
to this action for the statutory penalty is a defense unless the humanitarian doctrine
has been pleaded. Contributory negligence of both parents is a defense.3 Contributory negligence of the deceased is a defense. 4 Contributory negligence of the surviving parent is a defense. 5
The cases under discussion seem to go a little further, especially the Herrell case
which permits a recovery although cne of the plaintiffs was contributorily negligent.
The grounds for this decision are as follows: (1) That the cause of action accruing
to the father and mother is joint and indivisible; (2) that the negligent father has
no separate interest in the cause of action, and therefore the father and mother
jointly are the plaintiff, and a defense good as against one is not a defense to all
or any part of this joint cause of action; (3) that the defense of contributory negligence is a rule of convenience and does not go to the heart of the action; and (4)
that the negligence of the husband is not imputed to the wife merely because of
the marital relationship, and there must be an agency or joint enterprise relationship in order for the negligence of ary person to be a bar to another's cause of action.
An analysis of the above points raises a number of interesting questions. By the
express terms of section 4217, the father and mother, if both are living, have a
joint action for the death of their unmarried minor child, and each has an equal
interest in the judgment. On the basis of this part of section 4217, the Supreme
Court ruled that the penalty could not be apportioned between the negligent and
non-negligent parents; thus they allow the guilty beneficiary as well as the innocent
beneficiary to recover his or her share of the penalty. On principle it is clear that a
1. 23 S. V. (2d) 993 (decided July 30, 1929).
2. 23 S. W. (2d) 102 (decided Nov. 15, 1929).
3. Weise v. Re.mme, 140 Mo. 289, 41 S. W. 797
(1897).
4. Holwerson v. St. Louis & Suburban Ry. Co.,
157 Mo. 216, 57 S. W. 770 (1900);Huckshold v. Ry.

Co., 90 Mo. 548, 2 S.W. 796 (1886).
5. Chawkley v. Wabash Ry. Co., 317 Mo. 782,
297 S. W. 20 (1927). The court saidthat a negligent
mother was not in a position to claim a penalty for a
catastrophe to which her own act contributed.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES

beneficiary should not profit from his wrongful act. The reasons advanced by our
court for not following that general rule are as follows: (1) That the father has no
separate interest in the cause of action; and (2) that prior to judgment, he has no
separable interest in the penalty. Therefore, if his contributory negligence is a
defense at all it must go to the entire cause of action or to none of it. The first reason
advanced is sound enough; but the second reason seems to fall when examined in
the light of the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in the case of Phillips v.
Denver City Tramways Co.' In comparing the Colorado statute with the Missouri
statute it is seen: First, that it differs from our statute in that the mother is not a
necessary party plaintiff if the father is living, but if she is living, the father, in any
event, will hold one half the judgment in trust for her; second, it is like the Missouri
statute in that if both the father and mother are living, each has an equal interest in
the judgment, and thus as far as the difficulty of apportioning the damages is
concerned, the problem is the same. The Supreme Court of Colorado said: "Each
of the parties here have a half interest, and it would be an easy matter for the jury,
under the proper instructions and interrogatories, in case they find the father guilty
of contributory negligence as would defeat his recovery, to ascertain the amount
that should be given the mother whose rights are not precluded." In Missouri it
would seem to be even easier to apportion the judgment, for it is rendered on the
basis of being a penalty and not on the basis of being the amount of damages that
the various plaintiffs have sustained. In the Herrell case, it would seem that the
jury could have been instructed to first assess the penalty, and second to ascertain
whether or not the father was contributorily negligent. If the father was held contributorily negligent, and if both the father and mother were living, the court could
give judgment only to the mother for one half of the penalty assessed; or, if it
happened that the mother died before judgment was rendered, then the court
could refuse to give judgment at all; or, if it happened that the father died before
judgment was rendered, then judgment for the full amount of the penalty could
be rendered in favor of the mother by the provision in the statutes relative to
survivorship. Thus the possibility of the death of either joint plaintiff would seem to
be no reason for refusing to bar a negligent father from his share of the penalty,
when this unjust result could be avoided by a few special instructions.
Another line of cases 7 refuses to allow either the guilty or the innocent beneficiary to recover in cases similar to the Herrelt case. This rule is clearly unjust for it
would seem to be better to allow both the guilty and innocent beneficaries to recover
than to bar both, for surely the innocent beneficiary should not suffer because of
the other's wrongful act. In some states 8 it is impossible to let one parent recover,
without the other sharing in the judgment, because of the community property laws;
and therefore the most just result is to let both recover. But the cases in most of
the community property states, where this point has been decided, refuse to allow a
recovery by either. In other states,' where the administrator sues for the beneficiaries,
some bar all beneficiaries if any of the principal beneficiaries are negligent. As most
of these decisions were in states that have no laws of community property, and married women hold their property to their own separate use, this result seems unjust,
6. 53 Colo. 458, 128 Pac. 460 (1912).
7 and 8. Creveili v. RK..Cr,., 98 Wash. 42, 167 Pac.
66 (1917), 23 A. L. R. 696 (1923); Vinnette v. Nor.
them Pac. Ry. C]., 47 Wash. 320, 91 Par. 975, 18
L. R.A. N. S.328 (1907); Kenna v. Ry. Co., 57 Cal.
App. 124, 207 Pac. 35 (1922).
9. Hazel v. Bus. Co., 310 I1. 38, 141 N. E. 392

(1923); (1924) 22 Mich. L. Rev. 489; (1924) 72 Penn.
L. Rev. 333; (1924) 30 A. L. R. 491; (1924) 18 Ii.
L. Rev. 564; (1923) 23 A. L. R. 696; Novitsky v.
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 276 Ill. 102, 114 N. E. 545
(1916); Edwards v. Negley, 193 Ii. App. 426 (1914);
Tooner's Administrators v. Ry. Co., 109 Ky. 41, 58
S. W. 439 (1900).
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for it would have been possible to let the innocent beneficiaries recover and bar the
negligent beneficiaries on the basis that one cannot profit from his wrohigful act.
Another reason for the holding of the court in the Herrell case is that the defense of contributory negligence is merely a rule of convenience and that it does
not go to the heart of the action. Even if the above proposition be admitted, it
would seem that the maxim that "one shall not profit from his wrongful acts" shou'Id
prevai l to bar the negligent father from recovering his share of the statutory penalty;
for as shown above there are really no practical difficulties in the way in apportioning
the penalty."
An important question" raised in both the Herrell and Carney cases is that the
contributory negligence of the husband should not be imputed to the wife merely
10. The court as an additional reason for its
conclusion says that the defenses to the statutory
penalty named therein indicate that the law-makers
intended them to be preclusive; and, as the defense of
contributory negliggnce was not included in the
named defenses, they will not extend this defense to
cover cases not decided by precedent. It seems that
the legislature could be said to have intended merely
to make clear the usual defenses applied without
any intention of making such defenses preclusive.
11. An outline of cases, a part of which ib suggested by Professor Wigmore, Contributory Negligence of
Ihe Beneficiary as a Bar to the Administrator's Action
for Death (1908) 2 I1. L. Rev. 487, showing the relation of the cases under discussion to similar actions
for the death or injury of a child where the negligence
of someone might be set up in bar:
Case A.
Child
surviving:

Plea
1. Child's
negligence

Child's own
action for
corporeal
injury.

2. Parent's
negligence

Recovery
1. No.
Hight v. Bakery Co.
168 Mo. App. 433, 151
S. W. 776 (1912)
Henry. v. Ry. Co., 141
Mo. App. 351, 125
S. W. 794 (1910);
Green v. Ry. Co., 173
Mo. App. 276, 158
S. W. 740 (1913) (unless too young to be
guilty of contributory
negligence).
2, (a.) Yes, Missouri
and majority of decisions. Berry v. Ry.

Co., 214 Mo. 593, 114
S.
W.
27
(1908);
Neff v. Cameron, 213
Mo. 350, 111 S. W.

1139
(1908); Note
(1921) 15 A, L. R. 414;
Gilmore, Imputed Negligence (1921) 1 Wis. L.
Rev. 193.
(b.)

No,

minority.

Negligenlce of the parent or custodian is imputed to the child

where

the

child

is

incapable of exercising
the ordinary care of an
adult.
Hartfield v.
Roper, 21 Wend. (N
Y.) 615 (1839); Pastore
v. Livingston, 131 N.
Y. Supp. 971 (1911);
Morgan v. Ry. Co.,
115 Me. 171, 98 AtI.
628
(1916);
Note
(1921) 1 A. L. R. 423;
(1920) 19 Mich. L.
Rev. 108.

Case B.
Child
surviving:

3. Child's
negligence

Parent's action
for loss of
services.
4. Parent's
negligence
Case C.
5. Child's
Child deceased: negligence
Administrator's 6. Beneficiaction for
ary'a negliwrongful
gence
death.

3. No.
Note (1926) 42 A. L. R.
717; Gilmore, op.
clt. supra; (1926) 24
Mich. L. Rev. 592
(criticizing the existing
law).
4. No. Frick v. Ry. Co.,
75 Mo. 542, 545 (1882).
5. No. Huckshold v.
Ry. Co., supra note 4.

6. (a.) Bars negligent
beneficiaries
only.
Cleveland, C. C. & St.
L. Ry. Co. v. Grambo,
103 Ohio St. 471, 134
N. E. 648 (1921);
Wolf v. Ry. Co., 55
Ohio St. 530, 43 N. E.
708 (1896); Potts v.
Union Traction Co.. 75
W. Va. 212. 83 S. E.
918 (1914); Anderson
v. Ry. Co., 143 Tenn.
216, 227, S. W. 39
(1921); Note (1923)
23 A. L. R. 674 and 691
The theory is that the
administrator
brings
the acl'tion for the
benefit of the distributees and not for
the estate, and the
court will not allow one
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because of the marital relationship, and that an agency or joint enterprise relationship must be proved in this situation as in any other in order for the negligence of
one to bar another's cause of action. In the Herrell case the court gave the following reasons: (1) That the husband and wi/fe are no longer a unit motivated by the
husband since the enactment of the Married Women's Property Acts; (2) that the
husband is not liable for his wife's torts because of the marital relationship under a
recent statutory enactment; 2 and (3) that the husband and wife have equal powers
over the control and custody of their children by statute. 3 On the basis of the above
reasons a long list of Missouri cases 4 were expressly overruled in which it was
assumed without discussion that the negligence of one parent in failing to safeguard
the children would be imputed to the other parent. This pla ces Missouri in line
with the majority view, and it is clearly more in accord with our present day concept
of the marital relationship.
The minority view15 rests on the basis that each parent impliedly aithorizes the
other to act for the other in the common care and custody of their children; thus
on the basis of the marital relationship, they raise this implied warranty of authority to constitute each parent the agent of the other in the care of their children.
This view raises a fiction as bad as the old fiction of the unity of husband and
wife, for husbands or wives have no thought of acting as agents for the other in
the care of their children, but each acts for the best interests of the child.
to profit
from
wrongful act.

his

statutes.

(b.) All beneficiaries

joint action
by both
parents.

recover.
Wymore v.
Mahaska Co., 78 Iowa

396, 43 N.

W. 264

(1889);
Warren
v.
Manchester St. Ry.
Co., 70 N. H. 352, 47
Adt. 735 (1900); Sou-

thern Ry. Co. v.
Shipp, 169 Ala. 327, 53
So. 150 (1910); (1923)
2 Ore. L. Rev. 128;
(1925) 11 Va. L. Rev.
311; Note (1923) 23
A. L. R. 65S5,682. The
theory is that
the
action belongs to the
deceased's estate and
not to the beneficiaries.
(c.) Bars all beneficiaries.
See note 9,
supra for authorities.
Case D.
Plea
Recovery
Child deceased: 7. Negli7. No. Chawkley v.
gence of sole Wabash Ry. Co., Yupra
plaintiff.
note S.

Parent's action
8. Negligence of
under section
both
4217 of the
Plaintiffs.
Revised
9. Negligence of
Statutes
only one
of Missouri
1919, or similar parent in a
for wrongful
death of child

8.
No. Weise v.
Remme, Supra note 3.

9. (a.)

Negligent and

non-negligent
plaintiffs recover. Herrell v.
St. Louis-San Francis-

Situation
under
discussion.
10. Negli-

gence of deceased parent in an
action by
surviving
parent.

co

Ry.
note 2.

Co.,

upra-

(b.)
Only nonnegligent beneficiaries
recover.
Phillips v.
Denver City Tramways Co., supra note 6.
(c.) Neither of the
beneficiaries
recover.
See
supra
note
7
for authorities.
10. (a.) No.
Dar-

brinsky v. Pennsylvania Co., 248 Pa. 503
94 Atl. 269 (1915).

(b.) Yes , Carney v.
Chicago R. I. &. P. Ry.
Co., supra note 1.
12.Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) sec. 4241, enacted in
1915.
13. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) sec. 371, enacted in1913.
14. Frick v. Ry. Co., 75 Mo. 542 (1882) (instructions approved that the negligence of the plaintiff
or his wife would bar the plaintiff's action); Nagel v.
Ry. Co., 75 Mo. 653 (1882) (in an action by both
parents for the wrongful death of their child, it was
assumed that the negligence of the mother would bar
a recovery); Weise v. Remme, supra note 3; Levin v.,
Ry. Co., 140 Mo. 624, 41 S. W. 968 (1897); Mary
Albert v. Ry. Co., 192 Mo. App. 665, 179 S. W. 955
(1915); Jensen v. Kansas City, 181 Mo. App. 359,
168 S. W. 827 (1914); Howard v. Scarritt Estate Co.,
161 Mo. App. 552, 144 S. W. 185 (1912).
15. Darbrinsky v. Pennsylvania Co., .rupra note
11; Tooner's Administrators v. Ry. Co., supra note 9.
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It is interesting to note that in expressly overruling earlier Missouri cases on
the question the court in the Herrell case seemed to overlook the fact that the earlier
Carney case had already decided this same question,'but without any discussion
of the previous authorities in this state, although the two opinions cite the same
a'uthorities in other jurisdictions.
P. G. 0.

DEFENSE OF VOLUNTARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK DEPENDENT
UPON A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP.

Thompson v. City of Lamar.'

Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries received
while engaged in repairing the roof of a building, in the city of Lamar, by coming
into contact with the uninsulated wires of an electric lighting and power line owned
and operated by the defendant municipality. The plaintiff alleged that due to the
leaning condition of the poles to which the wires were attached the wires passed
over and above the corner of the building, on which the plaintiff was working,
about eighteen inches or two feet above the roof thereof; that said wires were loose
and sagging, and had no insulation of any kind upon them to protect workmen on
the roof of said building who might come in contact with them; and that such conditions had existed for such a length of time that the defendant city knew or could
have known of such conditions in time to have remedied the same. The plaintiff
further alleged that he saw the wires of defendant's said electric line, but he did not
know whether they carried a current of electricity or not; that he was constantly
careful not to come in contact with them; that, as he finished working on said roof
near the corner over which the wires passed, he stood up and started to turn around
and continue his work of repairing said roof, when a sudden gust of wind whipped
said wires against plaintiff's body and limbs, and as a result thereof he was rendered
unconscious and fell from the roof to the ground. The defendant pleaded contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The trial court refused the defendant's
instruction which sought to submit the issue of plaintiff's assumption of risk. On
appeal the supreme court said: "As we have heretofore said, the issue of assumption
of risk is ordinarily and peculiarly referable to the relation of master and servant,
and is based on contract, express or implied. We deem such issue inapplicable
to the present case, for no relation of master and servant, or other contractual relation, existed between plaintiff and defendant city. The instructions given on behalf
of both plaintiff and defendant fairly and fully submitted the issue of plaintiff's
contributory negligence, and no harm or error was committed by the trial court in
refusing defendant's instruction on the issue of assumed risk."
The purpose of this comment is to point out the fundamental difference between the doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk and that of contributory negligence, and to show that this distinction has not always been observed, with the
effect that no lit'tle confusion has resulted from the failure of the courts in this
respect. In order to lay any basis for a discussion of assumption of risk, it is necessary
to have an understanding of the differences between assumption of risk and contribu1.

17 S. W. (2d) 960 (1929).

confined

to the theoretical

This discussion is

distinctions between

assumption of risk and contributory negligence, and

any questions of master-servant

falling under the

Employers' Liability Acts or the Safety Device Acts
have been purposely avoided.
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tory negligence. The cases are either so silent or hopelessly confused as to be of little
value. Professor Bohlen points out the following fundamental differences:2
1. Voluntary assumption of risk negatives the idea of even prima facie liability. This is based upon a lack of a breach of any duty owed by the defendant to
the plaintiff. If the plaintiff voluntarily e'nters into association with the defendant,
if fully aware of the dangers, and assumes the risk of injury from such dangers, then
clearly the defendant has breached no duty for he owed none. Since the deferdant
owed no duty to the plaintiff there was never any liability.
2. The assumption of the risk must be voluntary, and must be made where
the plaintiff has knowledge of the danger. It is not enough that the plaintiff have
knowledge of the danger and encounters it; but it must also appear that the encountering of the danger was voluntary, and that no coercive force was applied or exerted.
If, after the plaintiff has entered into the association with defendant, some new
danger is discovered, plaintiff must have had an opportunity to have discontinued
such association and refuse, before he can be said to have voluntarily assumed the
risk.
3. Where the plaintiff has voluntarily assumed the risk, recovery is not refused
on the ground that the plaintiff has acted improperly or has fallen below the standard
of the normal man. Plaintiff may have exercised reasonable care. In fact he may
have had more than due regard for the danger and exercised extraordinary care.
The plaintiff may have had good reason for encountering such a danger. His action
may have been commendable. But whether prudent or reckless, the defendant owes
him no duty and there can be no recovery. The plaintiff was free to take or leave such
association. With full knowledge of the dangers he elected to take it, and defendant,
having consented to plaintiff's entering the association, owes him no duty beyond a
true disclosure of what the relationship is to be.
Continuing, Professor Bohlen makes the following observations on contributory
negligence:
1. Contributory negligence, though not universally, is generally an affirmative
defense. It displaces a prima facie liability established. Here there has been a breach
of a duty owed by the defendant so that prima facie there is liability. Yet even
though it be found that the plaintiff did not voluntarily assume the risk, this does
not negative the existence of contributory negligence nor prevent the defendant
from setting it up as a defense.
2. Contributory negligence excludes the idea of any deliberation; the plaintiff
has acted without due regard to the duty of self protection that he owes to himself.
3. The very essence of contributory negligence is that the plaintiff had misconducted himself. He has done or failed to do that which under the circumstances a
reasonably prudent man would not have done or failed to do.
If the defendant's act is unlawful but not negligent, it would seem that the
defense of contributory negligence was not available. Contributory negligence
means that the negligence of the plaintiff and of the defendant have contributed to
the injury. It is the plaintiff's negligence acting in concert with the antecedent
negligence of the defendant which makes it contributory. If the defendant has not
been negligent, then the plaintiff's negligence cannot in any way contribute to the
defendant's unlawful act in producing the injury. Yet assumption of risk would be a
defense if the plaintiff voluntarily and with kno'wledge encountered the danger.
If the defendant's act is negligent, then either contributory negligence or as2. Studies in the Law of Torts (1926) 500; Contributory Negligence (1908) 21 Harvard Law Reoiew
245.
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sumption of risk would be available as a defense, depending on the circumstances,
and the fact that one could not be proved would not negative the existence of the
other, but it would seem that there can never be a case ir which both defenses could
be proved to exist on the same set of facts.3 If the plaintiff has voluntarily assumed
the risk, then there is no breach of a duty by the defendant for there is no duty.
The two defenses are opposed to each other, in that contributory negligence is based
on a breach of a duty by the defendant as well as a breach of a duty by the plaintiff,
while assumption of risk negatives the existence of any duty owed by the defendant.
There is a class of cases in which the plaintiff may assume the risk and not be
precluded from recovery, as where he must either assume a certain known risk or
fail to fulfill a legal or moral duty, for the defendant is coerced into doing so by circumstances created by the defendant's fault.4 Then assumption of risk cannot be a
defense and only in case the plaintiff has not exercised due care in conducting himself
with reference to the known danger should recovery be denied.
The doctrine of assumption of risk first received prominent announcement in
the "springgun" case,5 but there was no effort made to draw any distinction between
contributory negligence and assumption of risk until later. Then came the opinion
of Shaw, J., in Farwell v. B. & W. R. R.,6 in which he said that the servant assumed
the ordinary risk of his employment. This decision was reached by making assumption of risk an implied condition in the contract of employment. A majority of the
courts, apparently in a haze, and groping for some distinction, seized on Shaw's
pronouncement and proceeded to lay great stress on the existence of a contract
between plaintiff and defendant.'
There are three theories as to the basis of this doctrine. A vast majority of the
courts hold that voluntlary assumption of risk is based on a contract either express or
implied. This is the position taken in the instant case.
3. But see Strother v. Milling Co., 261 Mo., 1
169 S. W. 43 (1914); Nodland v. Kreutzer & Wasem,
184 Ia. 476, 168 N. W. 889 (1918); Wescott v.
Chicago Great Western R. Co., 157 Minn. 325, 196
N. W. 272 (1923).
4. See Bohlen, V/oluntary Assumption of Risk
(1906) 20 Harvard Law Review 14. at 18 in which the
writer points out these eight situations;
a. In case of a market or a fair held on the premises.
b. Where a traveler uses a highway known to
be dangerous, but where there is no other safer
convenient way.
c. Where a tenant of offices or a flat, the approaches, stairs, halls etc., of which remain
under the care of the landlord, together with
the safe maintenance, knowing that this duty
has not been performed and that the approaches have been allowed to become unsafe,
remains in possession and does not immediately
throw up his lease.
d. Where a shipper of goods or an intending
passenger to whom the carrier is bound to
furnish carriage and access to and egress
from the premises for the purpose, knowing of
some slight imperfection in the appliances of
carriages or in the approaches to the dtation,
persists in having his goods carried or who uses
such defective means of access or egress.

e.

5.

Where a landowner's access or his premises
having been impeded or rendered dangerous by
the defendant's wrongful act, he braves the
danger to raise the siege.
Where by the defendanrt's wrongful misconduct
the plaintiff is in danger in the performance of
work not upon the defendants premises and at a
point where the plaintiff has a right to be
irrespective of the defendant's consent.
Where one moves to a nuisance, or knowing
of a wrongful act by an adjacent owner continues to use the land for the purposes for
which it is naturally adapted, but which
through the defendant's misconduct involves a
risk of injury to his person or property.
Where plaintiff under an exigency caused by the
defendant's wrongful misconduct, acts consciously and voluntarily in a way which
subjects him to a known danger, but where he
has so acted in the protection of some legal
right or in the performance of some legal or
social duty.
Ilott v. Wilkes, 3 B. & Aid. (1820).

6.

4 Met. 49 (1842).

f.

g.

h.

7. ,St. Louis Cordage Co. v. Miller, 126 Fed. 495
(C. C. A. 8th, 1903), Shelby Iron Co. et al v. Cole, 208
Ala. 657, 95 So. 47 (1922); St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry.
Co. v. Brogan, 105 Ark. 533, 151 S. W. 699 (1912);
Houston's Admn'x v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 123 Va. 290,
96 S. E. 270 (1918).

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES

In Oregon 8 estoppel has bteen given as the basis of the doctrine but that idea has
received no support.
The third and soundest basis is that assumption of risk rests on the maxim
"volenti non fit injuria" which is borrowed from the civil law.9 The denial of a recovery in a case where a plaintiff'has voluntarily assumed the risk is an outgrowth
of individualism. Each person should be responsible for taking care of himself, and
if he voluntarily assumes a known risk he alone is responsible for any injury therefrom.
If the contractual relationship is the basis of the doctrine then we have a clear
distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence. But the distinction is unsound and the best answer to this is found in the opinion of Jaggard, J.,
in Rase v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S. S. M. Ry. Co.,' 0 in which he says, "the exact
nature of the distinction however, is not generally agreed upon. It is often said
that assumption of risk is a matter of contract; contributory negligence of tort or of
conduct. This is fallacious. Both defenses are equally peculiar to the law of tort .....
the former (assumption of risk) is mere passive subjection by the servant to the risk
of injury inherent in known defective conditions. The latter (contributory negligence) is an act of omission on complainant's own part tending to add new danger to
his situation not necessarily incident to condition§, and bringing upon himself a
harm caused not solely by them, but created in part at least by his own misconduct.
Contributory negligence is a breach of a legal duty to take due care. Assumption of
risk is not a duty but is purely voluntary on the part of the servant. The doctrine
of assumption of risk rests on intelligent acquiesence with knowledge of the danger
and appreciation of the risk." While the term 'servant' is used, the same opinion
goes on and expressly says that assumption of risk is not limited to the cases where a
contractual relationship existed between the defendant and the plaintiff. There
is no good reason given for limiting the doctrine to cases of contractual relationship.
The only true question in such a case is whether the defendant owed the plaintiff
a duty. The non-existence of a duty owed to the plaintiff is as evident in a case
where the plaintiff and defendant have entered into no contractual relationship
as where they have. Voluntary assumption of risk is implied in the contracts of
employment between master and servant. But such implication is not based on the
contract itself, but arises from the conduct of the plaintiff.
The idea of estoppel hardly deserves mention. It would involve the plaintiff
being estopped to assert that the defendant was negligent. If the defendant owed
the plaintiff no duty there. could be no estoppel because the defendant was never
negligent.
The soundest basis of the doctrine is the civil maxim "volenti non fit injuria".
This recognizes that it is the plaintiff's own conduct which precludes his recovery and
also shows that there was never any liability on the defendant's part. The gist of the
doctrine is that the plaintiff, exercising his free volition has elected to encounter
a known danger, and since he is the caretaker of his own fate, and chooses to take a
hazardous course rather than one free from danger, the defendant owes no duty to
the plaintiff.
Some courts hold that assumption of risk has a dual aspect." In its technical
8. Busch v. Robinson, 46 Ore. 539, 81 Pac. 237
1905).
9. Obermeyer v. Chair Mfg. Co., 120 Mo. App.
59, 96 S. W. 673 (1906); Rigsby v. Oil Well Supply
Co., 115 Mo. App. 297, 91 S. W. 460 (1905); Fillingham v. St. Louis Transit Co., 102 Mo. App. 573, 77

S. W. 314 (1903). See the excellent discussion of this
subject in 3 Labatt's Master and Servant (2d ed.,
1913) secs. 1163-1204.
10. 107 Minn. 260, 120 N. W. 360 (1909).
11. I.ndiana Natural Gas & Oil Co., v. O'Brien,
160 Ind. 266, 65 N. E. 918 (1903). See also Filling-
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meaning it is confined to those cases where there issa contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. On the other hand they speak of "incurred
risk" or "running the risk" or "the risk or hazard" as being the equivalent of the
maxim "volenti non fit injuria." Incurred risk or running the risk is held to be of
universal application and is not confined alone to cases where the relation of the
parties is of a contractual nature. This distinction is wholly unnecessary. The same
result could be reached without the distinction and all confusion thereby avoided.
Furthermore, there are some difficulties attending such a distinction. In its technical
sense assumption of risk would seem to rest entirely upon the contract either express
or implied. Yet they hold that an infant assumes the risk which one of that age
should be aware of, and an infant's contract is voidable and may be disaffirmed
when the infant reaches his majority. How then could he be held to have assumed
any risk if he disaffirmed the contract when he be came of age? This seems to show
that the real basis of assumption of risk is conduct and not contract.
The Missouri courts have not only restricted assumption of risks to cases where
the relation of the parties is ofa contractual nature,'2 but they hold that the servant
does not even assume the risk of the master's negligence;13 and if the servant continues
in the service of the master with actual or constructive knowledge 'and without a
promise of a remedy, it then becomes a question of contributory negligence. In
.Pitamanv. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., 4 the court says, "under the doctrine
found in Missouri dealing with so called assumption of risk, the employee does not
assume the negligence of the master or that of a vice principal. The moment negligence comes in at the door it may well be said that assumption of risk goes out at the
window. We have here in Missouri come to use the term "assumption of risk" to
express the mere hazards that appertain to a dangerous avocation when unaffected by
the negligence of the master. When, however, the servant enters into or remains
in the service of the master with actual or constructive knowledge of the master's
negligence and without a promise of a remedy, we speak of this in our Missouri courts
as contributory negligence. Other courts for the most part call it true assumption
of risk."
This modification of an already limited doctrine, when carefully analyzed,
amounts to a holding that there is no such thing as assumption of risk. 5 They hold
that assumption of risk is not an issue where the master has been negligent. That
limits assumption of risk to cases where there is a contractual relation between the
parties and only there when the master has not been negligent. But in such cases
there is not any liability if the master has not been negligent because there is no
basis for any liability. If the defendant is negligent so as to have a basis for a
liability on the defendants part, assumption of risk is no defense because it does not
apply to cases where the master has been negligent. If there is negligence on the
defendants part, but no contractual relation between the parties, assumption of risk
ham v. St. Louis Transit Co., supra note 9, in which
the Missouri court says, "assumption of risk is never
available unless based upon contract or if not exclusively on contract, then on an act done so spontaneously by the party against whom the defense was
invoked, that he was a volunteer and any bad result
of the act must be attributed to an exercise of his
free volition instead of to the conduct of his adversary.
The word assumption imports a contract or some
kindred act of an unconstrained will."
Quoted
with approval in Tinkle v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co.,
212 Mo. 445, 110 S. W. 1086 (1908).

12. Goetz v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co., 320 Mo,
586, 9 S. W. (2d) 606 (1928). On motion for rehearing
the court expressly says that the case was not ruled
upon any question of contributory negligence -or
assumption of risk.
13. See Stother v. Milling Co., supra note 3,
the Missouri cases are collected in (1910) 28 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1217.
14. 259 Mo. 109, 168 S. W. 622 (1914).
15. (1910) 28 L. R. A. (N. S.)1217. (Collection of
Missouri cases).
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is no defense because of the lack of contractual relationship. Then clearly there is
no situation in Missouri where assumption of risk can be a defense. The effect of such
holdings has been to abolish assumption of risk entirely and to substitute contributory negligence in its place. The injustice of that is clear. The plaintiff may assume
a risk and still not be negligent.
A. E.

BILLS AND NOTES-TRANSFER WITHOUT INDORSEMENTRIGHT OF HOLDER FORVALUE TO INDORSEMENT. Ginter v. Commerce
Tkust Co.'
In an action upon a promissory note the Commerce Trust Company was sued
as an unqualified i.Pdorser. The note in question was either purchased from the
trust company without an indorsement or taken up to prevent a foreclosure. It was
later sold to the plaintiff. At the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed the
jury to return a verdict in favor of the trust company. After judgment on the verdict
Ginter appealed. The Kansas City Court of Appeals held that there was no error
committed in directing a verdict in favor of the Commerce Trust Company. Although only incidentally involved in the adjudication of the principal case, the
court ruled that "no presumption arises from the sale of a note that the seller intended to guarantee its payment by indorsing it in blank."
One fundamental requirement of securing the free and easy transfer of negotiable
instruments is that the rights of the transferee of an unindorsed negotiable instrument payable to the order of the transferor be definitely determined. When an
instrument payable to order is transferred by delivery, without indorsement, the
transferee acquires only such rights as would pass to the assignee of a paper not
negotiable, 2 and he takes subject to all defenses and equities to which it was subject
in the hands of the assignor.3 To preserve the negotiability of bills and notes,
statutory provisions give the transferee the right to demand written evidence of
the transfer in the form of the transferor's indorsement. As to the nature of the
indorsement, the Negotiable Instruments Law' and the Missouri Code' are silent.
The situation where the parties intended an assignment governed by rules of ordi1. 14 S. W. (2nd) 41 (Mo. App. 1929).
2. Patterson v. Cave, 61 Mo. 439 (1875); Gookin
v. Richardson, 11 Ala. 889 (1847); Simpson i'. Hall,
47 Conn. 417 (1879); Hashell v. Mitchell, 53 Me. 468
(1866); Minor v. Bewick,, 55 Mich. 491 (1885);
White v. Phelps, 14 Minn. 21 (1868); Berstein v
Fuerth, 132 Misc. 343, 229 N. Y. S. 791 (1930);
Tom-Pah-Pe v. Roddy, 130 Okla. 54, 265 P. 128
(1928); Klein v. Lancaster Trust Co., 290 Pa. 280,
138 A. 768 (1927); Puget Sound State Bank v.
Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 505, 162 P. 870
(1917).
3. Metropolitan Discount Co. v. Lyman, 194
Mo. App. 384, 266 S. W. 489 (1924); Townsend v.
Alewel, 202 S. W. 447 (Mo. App. 1918); Bishop v.
Chase, 156 Mo. 158, 56 S. W. 1080 (1900); Weber v.
Orten, 91 Mo. 677, 4 S. W. 271 (1887); Patterson v.
Cave, supra, note 3.
4. Negotiable Instruments Law, section 49.
"Where the holder of an instrument payable to his

order transfers it for value without indorsing it,the
transfer vests in the transferee such title as the trans.
feror had therein, and the transferee acquires, in
addition, the right to have the indorsement of the
transferor.
But for the purpose of determining
whether the transferee is a holder in due course, the
negotiation takes effect as of the time when' the indorsement is actually made."
5. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919), Section 835. "Where the
holder of an instrument payable to his order transfers
it for value without indorsing it, the transfer vests in
the transferee such title as the transferor had therein,
and the transferee acquires, in addition, the right to
enforce the instrument against one who signed for the
accommodation of his transferor, and the right to the
indorsement of the transferor if omitted by accident or
mistake. But for the purpose of determining whether
the transferee is a holder in due course, the negotiationtakes effect as of the time when the indorsement
was made."
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nary contracts is not treated in this note.6 The precise issue demanding solution here
is one concerning the rights of one who has given value 7 for a paper upon which the
transferor's indorsement was inadvertently omitted. That he takes the legal title, as
well as the equitable does not here concern us.
Section 44 of the Negotiable Instruments Law makes it possible for one who
has an obligation to indorse to limit personal liability.' This form of indorsement
does not impair negotiability in any way. We are concerned, in this note, with
whether a holder of an order instrument accidentally unindorsed must be content
with a qualified indorsement or, in the absence of any expressed or implied agreement
to the contrary, whether he may expect an indorsement without qualifications
which is the one most commonly used and expected in ordinary commercial transactions.
In an Indiana case decided before the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act, it was alleged that a contract was entered into by which the
defendant, for sufficient consideration, was to indorse certain notes for the plaintiff.
The Court instructed the jury that "where the agreement for the transfer is shown,
and a valuable consideration therefor, the party claiming that the transfer was to be
by delivery, or by indorsement 'without recourse', or otherwise than by simple
indorsement, has on him the burden of so proving." This instruction was held by
the Indiana Supreme Court to be a proper one.9
Perhaps the leading case on the point at issue in the United States is the Oregon
case of Simpson v. First National Bank of Rosebud.'0 It interprets the Oregon Statute
Section 5882, L. 0. L. which, like most states' statutes, including Missouri's, is
patterned after, and corresponds with, the forty-ninth section of the Negotiable
Instruments Law." Here was an action against the bank to recover a balance on a
bankrupt's note, which note, prior to the maker's bankruptcy, had been delivered
by the bank to the plaintiff for value and without an indorsement. The court ruled
that the above statute gives to the transferee the right to an unqualified indorsement
2
It should
unless the parties agreed that the indorsement should be qualified.
be noted in passing that this rule is not the same as that laid down in the principal
case. The Oregon Court, instead of refusing the presumption as did the principal
case, presumed an agreement to indorse generally in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary.
6. It is sufficient to say that to compel such a
transferor to indorse the instrument in any manner
would be manifestly contrary to justice and right.
The Missouri Code provides for this circumstance by
adding the words "if omitted by accident or mistake"
to what is practically the provisions of section 49
of the 'Negotiable Instruments law, which places
no express restriction upon the holder's right to the
transferor's indorsement. It seems evident that such
is the meaning of the statute without such express
limitation. Brewster, one of the leading authorities on
negotiability, believed that this section entitled the
transferee to an indorsement even where the omission
was intentional. He believed that in such case the
Mctransferor could indorse "without recourse."
Keehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law, found in
The Negotiable Instruments Law, Brannon, 3rd
11
Edition, p. 5 .
7. Negotiable Instruments Law, section 49 has no
pplication save when actual value is paid. Bond v.

Maxwell, 40 Ga. App. 680, 150 S. E. 861 (1930).
8. "Where any person is under obligation to
indorse in a representative capacity, he may indorse
in such terms as to negative personal liability."
There is no similar provision in section 49. James
Barr Ames says, "Such a provision should be added
Ames, Comments and Criticisms
to this section."
Upon the Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 Har. L.
Rev. 241.
9. Wade v. Guppinger et al, 60 Ind. 376 (1878).
10. 94 Or. 147, 185 P. 913 (1919).
11. Supra, note 7.
12. In Oregon the distinction between suits in
equity and actions at law is preserved. The Oregon
Supreme Court affirmed the action of the lower court
in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint but
remanded the cause with permission to the plaintiff
to amend the complaint so as to entitle her to relief
inequity.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES

In a Kansas case," one Lawrence, prior to the insolvency of the Citizens' State
Bank, had paid value for certain demand notes which the bank set aside from its
assets for him. The receiver refused to indorse them with any indorsement but a
limited one. Under an act"4 similar to the Missouri Act, 1' the Kansas Court held that
the holder would be entitled to an indorsement without any qualifications unless a
qualified indorsement was agreed to by the parties to the transaction or an agreement to make a qualified indorsement was fairly to be presumed from the accompanying circumstances.
The ruling of the principal case indicates that the transferee of an unindorsed
negotiable instrument must prove an agreement to indorse generally; and in the
absence of such proof, he must be content with a qualified indorsement. It did not
appear in the case that either of the parties had contracted for a general indorsement.
It is not contended that the transferee should be entitled to an unqualified indorsement when it appears that the intention of the parties was otherwise. It is contended
that the rule is in error in placing the burden of proving an agreement to indorse
without any qualifications upon the transferee.
Although there is little law upon this question, the rule in the Kansas case,' 6
along with that of the leading case, 7 seems to be a proper one. It announces a sound
interpretation of the statute and a logical determination of such a holder's rights. If
the parties had contemplated that a qualified indorsement was to be all that was
owing to him, since a general indorsement is commonly expected, there was necessarily an expressed or implied understanding. Instead of placing the burden of
proving the absence of such an agreement upon the transferee, as does the principal
case, it should rest upon the transferor to show the presence of such an agreement or
facts from which its presence may fairly be implied. If the transferor's proof of such
understanding is wanting, the transferee should be entitled to an unqualified indorsement. Such a rule would seem to give to the transferee no more than than to
which he is equitably entitled and appears to be a reasonable interpretation of Section
835 of the Missouri Statutes.
B. H.
13. Lawrence v. Citizens' State Bank, 113 Kans.
724, 216 P. 262 (1923).
14. Kans. Gen. Stat. 1915, Section 6576.

15.
16.
17.

Supra note 8.
Supra, note 13.
Supra, note 10.

